
Eric Eyo Partner
Court considers unclear dispute resolution clause in charterparty
In this case, the dispute resolution clause in the charterparty was unclear because of the manner in which amendments had been made to its standard terms. Upon the claimant making an application under s.32 Arbitration Act 1996 (“AA 1996”) for a declaration that a sole arbitrator had been validly appointed, the Court held that such applications are inappropriate where the respondent fails to participate in the arbitration. In such cases, s.72 AA 1996 preserves the non-participating party’s right to challenge jurisdiction.
A dispute arose under an amended Supplytime 2005 charterparty (the “Charterparty”) regarding unpaid invoices allegedly due from Schiste Oil and Gas Nigeria, the Charterers of MV Armada Tuah 101 (the “Vessel”), to Armada Ship Management, the Owners of the Vessel.
Box 34 of Part I of the Charterparty provided for English law and arbitration in London. The amended standard clause 34 of Part II further provided:
In April 2020, the Owners attempted to refer the dispute to LMAA arbitration and invited the Charterers to agree to the appointment of a sole arbitrator. The Charterers did not respond substantively. The proposed sole arbitrator expressed concern that clause 34(a) was confused and left the scope of his appointment and jurisdiction unclear.
The Owners applied to the LMAA for the appointment of a sole arbitrator, given that the parties could not agree. Pursuant to para. 11 of the LMAA Terms 2017, the LMAA President duly appointed a sole arbitrator (who was different to the sole arbitrator initially proposed by the Owners).
Subsequently, the Owners obtained the arbitrator’s consent to apply to the Court under s.32 AA 1996 for a determination and declaration regarding the validity of the sole arbitrator’s appointment.
The Court found that the requirements of s.32 had been met in principle in this case, namely: “that the determination of the question is likely to produce substantial savings in costs”; “that the application was made without delay”; and “that there is a good reason why the matter should be decided by the court” (s.32(2)(b)(i)-(iii)).
However, the Court also held that the s.32 procedure was not appropriate in circumstances where s.72 was engaged. Where s.72 preserved a non-participating party’s right to challenge jurisdiction, an order under s.32 could result in a determination on the question of jurisdiction against the interests of a party who had the protection of s.72.
Nonetheless, in order to assist the tribunal, the Court gave a non-binding indication of what its decision would have been in relation to the construction of the dispute resolution clause had a s.32 application been appropriate.
The Court found that the amendments the parties had made to clause 34 evidenced their intention that disputes should be determined by a sole arbitrator. However, it was unclear how that arbitrator would be appointed given the reference to both LMAA Terms and UNCITRAL Rules. Article 8(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules refers to a protocol for the appointment of a sole arbitrator by the “appointing authority” where the parties do not agree. Similarly, pursuant to para. 11 of the LMAA Terms 2017, the President of the LMAA may be called upon by either of the parties to appoint a sole arbitrator where the parties do not agree.
Therefore, reading these terms together, the Court considered that the President of the LMAA was the correct authority to appoint the arbitrator for the purposes of Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Rules. Furthermore, the current sole arbitrator had been appointed by the President of the LMAA in compliance with the UNCITRAL Rules, notwithstanding that he made the appointment on the basis of para. 11 of the LMAA Terms.
This decision makes abundantly clear that any amendments to standard form clauses should be made carefully, in order to ensure that the clauses remain coherent. Whilst s.32 applications are rare, this judgment also clarifies that such applications ought not to be made in circumstances where s.72 applies.
31-05-2023 / Maritime
The Court of Appeal has held that the Hague-Visby Rules one-year time bar applied to the Claimant bank’s claim under the bills of lading for mis-delivery after discharge. As a result, the claim was out of time. Read our article, by William Chetwood, Reema Shour and Sharon Msiza, for a discussion of the decision.
24-05-2023 / Maritime
In this commodities dispute, the Court has found that the arbitral appeal tribunal had misdirected itself on whether the claimant’s losses were too remote to be recoverable. In their article, Joanna Steele and Reema Shour discuss why the Court came to this conclusion.
15-05-2023 / Maritime
The Supreme Court has dismissed an argument that an oil spill emanating from the sea constituted a continuing nuisance and provided the claimants with a continuing cause of action for so long as the oil remained on their land. The oil spill was a one-off event and the cause of action accrued and was complete once the claimants’ land had been affected by the oil. Read our article, by Chris Kidd, Sophie Forsyth and Reema Shour.
10-05-2023 / Maritime
The Court of Appeal has considered the status of a bill of lading in the hands of charterer after it ceases to be a charterer. Is it a document of title or a mere receipt? Our article, by Jamila Khan, Iain Preston and Reema Shour, analyses the decision.
04-05-2023 / Commodities & Trade, Energy & Infrastructure, Hospitality & Leisure, Maritime, TMT
KSA has been actively pursuing economic diversitication for investors to do business in the Kingdom. The first Special Economic Zone has now been established, with special commercial regulations.
27-04-2023 / Maritime
Court finds there was no binding arbitration agreement between parties. Emirates Shipping Line DMCEST v. Gold Star Line Ltd [2023] EWHC 880 (Comm) The underlying contract in this dispute was a 2018 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing the operation of a container shipping line. The 2018 MOU contained an LMAA arbitration clause.